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Abstract 
 
Security and privacy are the inherent problems in 
RFID communications. There are several protocols 
have been proposed to overcome those problems. Hash 
chain is commonly employed by the protocols to 
improve security and privacy for RFID authentication. 
Although the protocols able to provide specific 
solution for RFID security and privacy problems, they 
fail to provide integrated solution. This article is a 
survey to closely observe those protocols in terms of its 
focus and limitations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Radio frequency identification or RFID was first 
used during the Second World War in Identification 
Friend or Foe systems onboard military aircraft. Soon 
after, Harry Stockman demonstrated a system 
energized completely by reflected power. Then in 
1960s, the first Electronic Article Surveillance anti-
theft systems were commercialized. Later, in 1970s, 
the US Department of Energy investigated the 
technology’s potential to safeguard materials at nuclear 
weapons sites [17].  
Recently, radio frequency identification (RFID) has 
been regarded as the main driver of the future 
ubiquitous technology. It is also claimed as the core 
technology to realize internet of things environment 
where large amount of items are connected seamlessly 
anytime and anywhere [2]. RFID offers simplicity for 
people to object (P2O) and object to object (O2O) 
communications. It is believed that it will play a 
significant role for future ubiquitous society [11].  
Generally, RFID systems consist of Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) tags and RFID 
readers. While RF tags operate as transponders, RF 
readers act as transceivers. In case of a more complex 
application, a database server is required to store 
information comes from both transponders and 
receivers sides [12].  
It is assumed that communication between RF tags 
and server is secure. The process of RFID 
communication can be described as follows, RFID 
reader request access to the RFID tag and return the 
reply to the database server. After identification and 
authentication on server side, then server will return 
the information of RFID tag to the reader [12][13].  
Automatic identification is the basic characteristic of 
RFID. In its simplest form, identification can be 
binary, e.g., paid or nor paid which is useful for 
alerting. Therefore, alerting is become the next 
powerful feature of RFID. Also, RFID enable real time 
monitoring to a large number of in a short time. In 
addition, RFID has ability to perform on-chip 
computation, accordingly it support cryptographic 
protocol for authentication. In general, RFID has four 
basic capabilities, identification, alerting, monitoring, 
and authentication [9].   
RFID has become a new and exciting area of 
technological development, and is receiving increasing 
amounts of attention. There is tremendous potential for 
applying it even more widely, and increasing numbers 
of companies have already started up pilot schemes or 
successfully used it in real-world environments. 
Based on the various industry areas that are featured 
in the reviewed literature, RFID technology is widely 
used in many areas such as  
- Animal detection. 
- Aviation. 
- Transportation. 
- Building management. 
- Construction. 
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- Enterprise feedback control. 
- Fabric and clothing. 
- Food safety warranties. 
- Health,  
- Military, etc. 
Therefore, RFID related business experiences many 
significant advantages. Das [21] confirms market 
research report from IDTechEx that the increasing 
sales of RFID tags for the 60 years up to the beginning 
of 2006 reached 2.4 billion, which was accounted for 
more than 600 million tags being sold in 2005. Then in 
2006, it was expected that approximately 1.3 billion 
tags and 500 million RFID smart labels would be 
needed in a range of areas, such as retailing, logistics, 
animals and farming, library services, and military 
equipment.  
In terms of academic point of view, RFID is 
regarded as an exciting research area due to its relative 
uniqueness and exploding growth. RFID research has 
led to the emergence of a new academic research area 
that builds on existing research in a host of disciplines, 
such as electronic engineering, information systems, 
computer science, environmental science, medical and 
public health and also business strategic management, 
and there has been a significant increase in the number 
of papers on RFID in research journals [20]. As noted 
by Heinrich [22], RFID is likely to be among the most 
exciting and fastest-growing technologies in terms of 
scope of application in the next generation of business 
intelligence which attract many researchers from 
different field to collaborate in a specific research. 
However, to continue the advancement of 
knowledge in this area, it is important to understand 
the current status of RFID research and to examine 
contemporary trends in the research domain. It is vital 
to determine the principal concerns of current RFID 
research, whether technological, application related, or 
security related. An academic review of the literature is 
essential for appropriately shaping future research. 
One of a growing area in RFID literature is 
authentication protocol with hash chain model which 
will be deeply discussed in this paper. The rest of this 
paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
will briefly review security and privacy issues of 
RFID. The application of hash chain in RFID 
authentication is presented in Sections 3. In Section 4, 
we propose our comparative study of recent RFID 
authentication protocols based on hash chain model. 
And some conclusions will be made in the last section. 
 
2. Security and privacy of RFID 
 
RFID technology poses exclusive privacy and 
security concerns since it is promiscuous the tags 
themselves typically maintain no history of past 
readings. As a result, security and privacy issues are 
considered as the fundamental issue the RFID 
technology [4][12]. 
 
2.1. Security Objectives 
 
Although generally it is assumed that 
communication between RFID tag and the readers is 
secure, yet since it is basically wireless based 
communication, a number of security and privacy 
issues could not be avoided. Fundamental information 
security objectives, such as confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, authentication, authorization, non-
repudiation and anonymity are often not achieved 
unless special security mechanisms are integrated into 
the system [23]. 
The privacy aspect has gained special attention for 
RFID systems. Consumers may carry objects with 
silently communicating transponders without even 
realising the existence of the tags. Passive tags usually 
send their identifier without further security 
verification when they are powered by electromagnetic 
waves from a reader. The ID information can also be 
linked to other identity data and to location 
information. Consumers might employ a personal 
reader to identify tags in their environment but the 
large number of different standards may render this 
difficult. Therefore, user privacy is the main 
consideration of RFID security. 
 
2.2. Security Properties 
 
A. Confidentiality 
The communication between reader and tag is 
unprotected in most cases. Eavesdroppers may thus 
listen in if they are in immediate vicinity. Furthermore, 
the tag’s memory can be read if access control is not 
implemented.  
B. Integrity 
With the exception of high-end ISO 14443 systems 
which use message authentication codes (MACs), the 
integrity of transmitted information cannot be assured. 
Checksums (CRCs) are often employed on the 
communication interface but protect only against 
random failures. Furthermore, the writable tag memory 
can be manipulated if access control is not 
implemented. 
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C. Availability  
Any RFID system can easily be disturbed by 
frequency jamming. But, denial-of-service attacks are 
also feasible on higher communication layers. 
D. Authenticity 
The authenticity of a tag is at risk since the unique 
identifier (UID) of a tag can be spoofed or 
manipulated. The tags are in general not tamper 
resistant.  
 
2.3. RFID Security and Privacy Schema 
 
To get a clear understanding on how those security 
and privacy issues exist within RFID technology, a 
schema introduced in [17] is presented.  
Garkenfield, et.al. [17] clearly describe the actual 
existing security and privacy problems within RFID 
technology as can be seen in figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Security and Privacy threats within RFID 
 
They use the Electronic Product Code (EPC) based 
schema as a popular account of RFID technology. It 
shows where security and privacy threats exist within 
common RFID applications.  
Physical attacks, denial of service, man in the 
middle attack, eavesdropping, traffic analysis, 
counterfeiting, and tag cloning attack are several 
security related problems commonly addressed to 
RFID technology [10][17].  
In terms of privacy, RFID is mainly questioned in 
tracking and inventorying capabilities. Another privacy 
concern is authentication problem. Authenticating legal 
communication between RFID tag and reader is the 
main question intensive studies in this field 
[10][12][13]. 
This paper surveys some papers that introduce RFID 
authentications with hash chain method. 
 
3. Hash Chain Model and Its applications  
in RFID authentication 
 
Hash chain is basically a cryptography approach for 
safeguarding against password eavesdropping which is 
firstly proposed in [7]. Now, it can be found in other 
applications such as micropayment systems and RFID 
authentication due to elegant and versatile low-cost 
associated to this technique.  
Lamport [7] describes that a hash chain of length N 
could be constructed by applying a one-way hash 
function h(.) recursively to an initial seed value s. 
 
hN(s) = h(h(...h(s)...)) (N times) 
The last element hN(s) is also called the tip T of the 
hash chain. By knowing hN(s),  hN-1(s) can not be 
generated by those who do not know the value s, 
however given hN-1(s), its correctness can be verified 
using hN(s). This property of hash chains has evolved 
from the property of one-way hash functions [7]. 
Then, the application of hash chain model into RFID 
application is firstly introduced by Ohkubo et.al [8]. 
After reviewing previous protocols for improving 
privacy of RFID applications, they suggest five points 
for an approach to RFID scheme design.  
-  keep complete user privacy. 
- eliminate the need for extraneous rewrites of the 
tag information. 
-  minimize the tag cost. 
- eliminate the need for high power of computing 
units. 
-  provide forward security. 
Their protocol for secure RFID privacy protection 
scheme is described as follows [8]. 
 
. 
Figure 2. Hash chain in RFID application. 
Hash chain technique is employed to renew the 
secret information contained in the tag from G to H. 
The following is a brief description how it works. In 
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the beginning, a tag has initial information s1. In the i-
th transaction with the reader, the RFID tag will do two 
things: 
1. Sends answer ai = G(si) to the reader, 
2. Renews secret si+1 = H(si) as determined from 
previous secret si, 
where H and G are hash functions, as in Figure 1. 
The reader sends ai to the back-end database. 
The back-end database maintains a list of pairs (ID, 
si), where si is the initial secret information and is 
different for each tag. So the back-end database that 
received tag output ai from the reader calculates a0i = 
G(Hi(si)) for each si in the list, and checks if ai  a’i. 
Then, it will find a’i, a’i = ai, then return the ID, which 
is a pair of a’i. 
This is the basic hash chain method implementing 
in RFID authentication protocol which is then followed 
by many researchers by proposing new protocols in 
different perspectives and techniques.  
 
4. Comparative study of hash chain based 
RFID authentication protocols  
 
This part will discuss several RFID authentication 
protocols that using hash chain as a method for 
properly enhancing security and privacy of RFID. We 
introduce hash chain method of each protocol and 
review its limitation. There are ten protocols of RFID 
authentication with hash chain will be compared in this 
section. 
As mentioned earlier, Ohkubo et al. [8] proposed a 
hash-based authentication protocol. The aim of the 
protocol is to provide better protection of user privacy 
with the basic concept of refreshing the identifier of the 
tag each time it is queried by a reader. The protocol 
changes RFID identities on each read based on hash 
chains. Hash chain method is used in this two ways 
communication of RFID tag. This protocol does not 
require a random number generator.  However, it is 
confirmed that this protocol is flawed to certain replay 
attacks.  
The next protocol is a cryptographically controlled 
access protocol for RFID tag by using hash locks was 
proposed by Weis et al. [15]. They argue that although 
the hash value can be read out by any reader, yet only 
authorized ones would be able to look up the tags key 
in a database of key-hash pairs. The objective of this 
protocol is improving RFID tag security and privacy 
by using an integrated hash function where key could 
be verified by comparing the key hash with the stored 
hash value. The drawback of this protocol is that the 
static hash value would still be traceable. 
In addition, Molnar et al. [4] proposed a hash-tree 
based authentication protocol for RFID tags. They 
exposed privacy issues related to RFID in libraries, 
described current deployments, and suggested novel 
architectures for library RFID. This protocol utilizes a 
dynamic amount of computation required per tag, 
which depends on the number of tags available in the 
hash-tree. However, the protocol is confirmed has a 
serious problem, where another security leak will arise 
if the tag lost. In this case, anonymity for the rest of the 
hash-tree group may be compromised by attacker. 
Therefore, the protocol does not provide for forward-
anonymity.  
The following approach is the hash chain based 
RFID authentication protocol by Henrici [3]. This 
protocol only requires a hash function in the tag and 
data management at the back-end. It offers a high 
degree of location privacy and is resistant to many 
forms of attacks. Further, only a single message 
exchange is required, the communications channel 
needs not be reliable and the reader/third party need 
not be trusted, and no long-term secrets need to be 
stored in tags. However, the limitation of this protocol 
is that it does not guarantee to provide full privacy, 
since the tag is vulnerable to tracing when the attacker 
interrupts the authentication protocol mid-way. 
Therefore, this approach also has  
Then, Avoine [5] introduced the modification of 
authentication protocol. This proposed protocol is 
aimed at solving the replay attack problem of [8]. He 
argued that privacy issues cannot be solved without 
looking at each layer separately, where RFID system 
has three layers, application, communication and 
physical. Yet, it does not consider the issue of 
availability, and the protocol is vulnerable to attacks 
where the attacker forces an honest tag to fall out of 
synchronization with the server so that it can no longer 
authenticate itself successfully. 
Similarly, anonymous RFID protocol is also offered 
by Dimitriou [19]. The objective of this protocol is to 
protecting forward privacy from cloning and privacy 
attacks. Mutual authentication is performed within the 
protocol based on the use of secrets which are shared 
between tag and database, and refreshed to avoid tag 
tracing. Yet, limitation of the protocol is addressed to 
desynchronization problem which occurs in database 
side. This is confirmed to be vulnerable from man in 
the middle attack. 
The following protocol is offered by Rhee et al. [6]. 
It is called hash-based challenge-response which is 
aimed at providing security protection mechanism 
from the replay and spoofing attacks. The proposed 
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protocol is based on challenge response using one-way 
hash function and random number which is claimed 
suitable for security database environment. Hash chain 
function is used in the protocol to guarantee secret key 
in the form of ID. Then, the tag does not need to 
update the secret key which avoids attacks by 
interrupting the session. However, this solution does 
not provide forward secrecy which means if a tag can 
be compromised then attacker will be able to trace the 
past communications from the same tag. 
Lee et al. [18] proposed a new RFID authentication 
protocol with hash chain. The objective of this effort is 
to solve the desynchronization problem by maintaining 
a previous identification number in the database server. 
However, since the hashed identification number is 
always identical, an adversary who queries tag actively 
without updating identity able to trace the RFID tag. 
Unfortunately, although it able to secure 
desynchronization problem, this protocol still suffer 
from traceability attack which is become a serious 
limitation of the protocol to solve privacy problem of 
RFID. 
Likewise, RFID authentication scheme whith a hash 
function and synchronized secret information was 
introduced by Lee, et.al. [14]. The protocol is aimed at 
securing user privacy including against tag cloning 
attack through an additional hash operation. 
Unfortunately, this protocol suffers from 
desynchronization attacks that could be conducted by 
adversaries. This occurs due to unavailability of PRNG 
in the RFID tag while the server does not know how 
many times an RFID tag may have not yet updated its 
secret information.  
Finally, Han,et.al. [13] offer new kind of mutual 
authentication protocol to solve some problems of 
previous protocols. In their protocol, the authentication 
mechanism is supported by a monitoring component. 
The component which exists in database server, 
constantly monitors the synchronized secret 
information between RFID tag and reader. This 
protocol is argued to provide more secure 
communication mechanism since the communication 
between tag, reader and database is mutually 
authenticated and constantly monitored. In addition, 
the protocol also supports the low-cost non-volatile 
memory of RFID tags. However, it also has limitation 
since it still needs the back-end database support. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of all RFID authentication 
protocols with hash chain method. 
 
 
As can be seen in table 1, all protocols being studied 
are vary in terms of the way of using hash chain 
method but focus on the same objective that is 
providing better privacy mechanism while maintaining 
anonymity . 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
RFID authentication protocols in this study provide 
privacy and anonymity. Hash chain method is used in 
these RFID authentication protocols in various ways a 
unique solution for security and privacy problems of 
RFID technology. As a result, while problems in 
particular cases can be addressed, other problem is 
arising. Therefore, it can be concluded that recent 
RFID authentication protocols with hash chain failed 
to satisfy an integrated security and privacy solutions 
for RFID. 
Based on the findings, we recommend future study 
in this area to focus on a level such as developing a 
framework for RFID authentication model. The 
framework will be useful for researchers as a 
foundation for collaborative research in the future for 
integrated RFID authentication solutions.  
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